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“I MADE A HUGE MISTAKE WITH MY LIFE” –  
THE HARMS OF PROSTITUTION  
AS MIS-REFLECTED IN ISRAELI LAW 
 
Shulamit Almog & Gal Amir1 
 
 
 
In memory of Victoria K. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
You are wounded inside, hurting inside. You can’t really describe it . . . I think that even 
when I’m seventy I’ll remember this time in my life and it will eat me from inside. It 
hurts so badly. It’s a wound; it’s traumatic, just like violence. I think it’s worse than 
being beaten up. Prostitution is lethal, it kills you . . . You are ending up slowly, bit by 
bit, and you hate yourself so much, you hate them. The very fact that I’ve had to have sex 
with people that in most cases I wasn’t attracted to, sometimes repulsed by. I’ve had to 
have sex with people for money. So that I’ll have something to eat, be able to pay the 
rent. I think it’s horrible. It’s horrible and it still hurts me. I feel bad. I feel as if other 
people are better than me. I feel that I made a huge mistake with my life.2 
 
This is how Mattie, a 44 year old Israeli woman describes her life in prostitution. This 
description reflects an image of a physically and mentally wounded woman, facing a lifelong 
struggle with the harms inherent to prostitution. Is such an image that is common to many 
women in prostitution, present in the legal sphere? Should it generate regulatory consequence? 
Can one and should one conceptualize Mattie’s harms in a way that will be rendered into a 
meaningful legal outcome? 
 
Israeli case law reveals different images of women in prostitution. Here is, for example, the 
victim in Yuri Dorov v. The State of Israel,3 who was described by the Israeli Supreme Court as 
humiliated, deprived of dignity, exploited, commoditized and objectified individual.4 Yet other 
Israeli Supreme Court rulings suggest images of women in prostitution as free-willed 
                                                 
1 Shulamit Almog is a Full Professor of Law at the University of Haifa, Co-Director of the Center of Law, 
Gender and Policy. Dr. Gal Amir is a research fellow at the Jewish-Arab Center at the University of 
Haifa.  
We thank Lina Makhuli for outstanding research assistance and Linoy Even-Kesef for her inspiring work. 
2 Mattie (Dec. 2, 2016), in Linoy Even-Kesef, "The social infamy of women in prostitution in Israel- Its 
nature and implications" (2018) (M.A. thesis, Open University of Israel) (on file with the Ingeborg 
Rennert Library at Open University of Israel).  
3 49 CA 8523/99 Dorov v.  State of Israel 54(4) PD 837, 843 (2000) (Isr.).   
4 See also Cr.A. 1652/07 Yan Normatov et. al. v. State of Israel (2007) (Isr.).  
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individuals, engaging in a “transaction between two adults, aware of what lies ahead.”5 Such 
transactions are perceived by the Court as legitimate, though somewhat sleazy, as famously 
described by the late Supreme Court Judge Mishael Cheshin while referring to a defendant who 
engaged in prostitution –– “I will not dine with her at my Sabbath table, but I don’t think she 
should be imprisoned.”6 Similar images of prostitution as a basically legitimate occupational 
choice are present in a controversial 2016 Tel-Aviv Municipal Court judgment, which ruled that 
although running brothels is illegal according to Israeli penal law, this law will not be enforced if 
the women that offer the sexual services run themselves the brothel in question.7  
 
Who, then, is the Israeli woman in prostitution that faces the courts, and how do the courts 
conceptualize the meaning of her being a woman in prostitution? Prostitution related issues, such 
as the conflicting demands to legalize it, to criminalize it, or to criminalize solely the man paying 
for sex (following the Nordic model) are constantly brought up and debated in court hearings, 
parliamentary sessions, expert panels, academic forums and the media. Within these debates, 
women in prostitution are sometimes described as free agents, bearing full responsibility for 
incurred harms, and sometimes as victims of exploitive social construction. 
 
As we put forward, it is imperative that prostitution will be richly conceptualized in the legal 
arena. In order to responsibly do that, policy makers are obliged to thoroughly address the issue 
of harms inherent to prostitution.  
 
Worldwide, courts constantly face the need to conceptualize harms not yet recognized by 
statutory or case law. Such harms can be a product of technological innovation or a product of 
social development in the dynamic and globalized 21st century societies. Courts legally 
conceptualize such unrecognized harms in order to achieve socially desired goals as well as legal 
remedies. When doing so, courts assert that the state, via its legal system, has the responsibility 
to provide an adequate protection to its citizens from various harms, both in the private and 
public spheres. Such assertion is no less relevant in regard to the harms of prostitution, which so 
far, are almost invisible to the legal eye.  
 
At this point, it should be asserted that Israeli courts adamantly confront human trafficking. Yet, 
they hardly make an effort to confront or even to recognize the full range of prostitution related 
harms. In this article we shall attempt to uncover what the courts’ gaze may be missing.  
 
II. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HARM 
 
                                                 
5 CrimA 3520/91 Turjeman v. State of Israel 47(1) PD 441, 459 (1993) (Isr.) (Cheshin, J., dissenting). 
Cheshin’s dissent is frequently quoted in later rulings and serves as a basis for Israel’s State Attorney’s 
guidelines for the enforcement of prostitution related offenses.  
6 Id. at 466.  
7 MiscO (T.A.) 1424-02-14 State of Israel v. Haddad (2016) (Isr.); Vered Lee, The Judge Chose to 
Imagine that in Israel There is Independent Prostitution, HAARETZ: JUSTICE & CRIMINAL NEW (May 
31, 2016) (criticizing the ruling of MiscO (T.A.) 1424-02-14 State of Israel v. Haddad (2016) (Isr.)).  
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“There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at all 
outside it that can be held to be good without limitations, excepting only… a good will.”8  
 
In these famed first words of “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,” Immanuel Kant 
commenced a deontological theory of ethics, examining the moral virtue of human action rather 
than its results. The Israeli Supreme Court has been known to quote Kantian ethics as an 
inspiration for its rulings, endeavoring to establish Israeli society on solid moral ground.9 But 
then Kantian ethics –– vague and incomprehensible according to Kant himself –– cannot 
supplant mundane judiciary practice.10 A judge has to examine not merely actions, but their 
results as well, and particularly the legal meaning of the harms caused by these actions. 
 
In many legal contexts –– in criminal, civil and public law –– it is the courts’ primary mission to 
conceptualize harm. Such conceptualization is frequent in torts or contract law, where harms can 
be clear and tangible. This is most apparent in cases involving physical harms. A case involving 
a vehicular accident is focused on the plaintiff’s actual damages. The litigants provide evidence 
of concrete harms, employing, what can be denoted as, metaphorically, a template of “harm 
poetics” –– pain and suffering and loss of amenity, loss of earnings or medical expenses, etc.11 
 
But sometimes, in other fields of law, harms are more evasive, and judges develop new tools in 
order to conceptualize them. In such cases, judges employ theoretical tools to acknowledge the 
harms and address them legally. A good example are abstract legal concepts such as “reputation” 
or “privacy,” How can harms to reputation or privacy be enumerated? How can a plaintiff be 
defended from such harms? Courts have managed to measure these harms and grant, through 
well-established legal doctrines, efficient protection and compensation to plaintiffs claiming their 
privacy or reputation was impaired. These doctrines were developed, established, and recognized 
long before courts had to address the even more abstract harms to privacy or reputation occurring 
in the new 21st century digital spaces.  
 
However, even an established doctrine has a moment of birth; a beginning in which it is not yet 
an established doctrine but merely a bold innovation. The US Supreme Court provides an 
illuminating example. In 1928 the Court faced novel legal questions raised by new technologies. 
                                                 
8 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 9 (Allen J. Wood ed. & 
trans., 2002) (1785).  
9 E.g. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance (2009) (Isr.) (Arbel, J., 
concurring) (“As the philosopher Immanuel Kant said, a person should not be treated solely as a means of 
achieving external goals, since this involves a violation of his dignity, or in his words: ’Accordingly, the 
practical imperative should be as follows: act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in yourself 
or in any other person, always also as an end, and never merely as a means’”), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/ 05026050.n39.pdf.  
10 “And thus, we indeed do not comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral 
imperative, but we do comprehend its incomprehensibility.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF 
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 79 (Allen J. Wood ed. & trans., 2002) (1785). 
11See Shulamit Almog, Windows and ’Windows’: Law and Literature in a Digital Age, 57 U. TORONTO 
L. J. 756 (2008) (discussing the term “legal poetics”).  
3
Amir and Almog: "I Made a Huge Mistake with My Life"
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2018
4 ALMOG & AMIR: THE HARMS OF PROSTITUTION AS MIS-REFLECTED IN ISRAELI LAW 
 
In Olmstead v. United States, federal agents12 uncovered a criminal enterprise led by a person 
named Roy Olmstead. Olmstead and his partners operated a gang that possessed, transported and 
sold alcohol –– unlawful acts under the Prohibition era Volstead Act. The overwhelming 
evidence against them was obtained through wiretapping. Olmstead’s lawyers claimed that, 
although the physical acts that led to obtaining the evidence did not trespass Olmstead’s 
property, wiretapping had violated Olmstead’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, 
all evidence obtained through the wiretap was found to be impermissibly seized and, 
accordingly, was ordered suppressed at trial. 
 
The US Supreme Court found itself in a strange, new legal environment. Dealing with the 
relatively novel technological innovation –– the telephone –– was not the main problem. The 
public atmosphere of the Prohibition era, the rise of organized crime in the United States and the 
founding of federal agencies to fight it, created a situation that required creative thinking from 
judges and attorneys alike. The physical space of Olmstead’s house constituted a well-defined 
territory, protected by law. The Court had to figure out the nature of a phone line. Is it an 
extension of the house, and therefore protected as well? Olmstead’s physical property was not 
trespassed; his “privacy” was. How far outside his house did his privacy extend? To effectively 
answer this question, a new way of conceptualizing space was called for. A majority of the Court 
chose not to conceptualize the new threats to US citizens’ privacy, and ruled that the wiretapping 
was legal. But Judge Brandeis, who dissented in the case, wrote the following:13   
 
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not 
likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home. 
 
As it turns out, Judge Brandeis had a firmer grasp of the future than his colleagues, and his vision 
indeed predicted the actuality of the second decade of the 21st century. Four decades later, the 
United States Supreme Court overturned the Olmstead ruling.14 Still, technological and social 
progress continue to challenge the US Supreme Court, as well as other courts worldwide, to re-
examine the questions raised by the interplay between newly evolved technologies, social 
developments, and traditional legal doctrines.15 
 
Israeli courts are also sometimes required to review new technological realities and 
conceptualize yielded harms. An example, in which the conceptualization of the harms was 
                                                 
12 The agency in question was the Bureau of Prohibition. Operating between 1920 and 1933, it was 
commissioned to enforce the prohibition on the use of alcohol. During this period, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, led by J. Edgar Hoover, began to emerge from a powerless and ineffective agency into a 
powerful and influential one. See CLAIRE BOND POTTER, WAR ON CRIME: BANDITS, G-MEN, & 
POLITICS OF MASS CULTURE (1998).  
13 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928). 
14 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
15 In 2015, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated a case with circumstances similar to the 
Olmstead case. In United States v. Jones, FBI agents planted a GPS tracker in the car of a suspected drug 
dealer. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  
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extremely complex, is the Israeli Supreme court’s recent ruling in the case of Hashavim H.P.S. 
Business Information Ltd. v. Court Administration.16 The appeal to the High Court of Justice17 
raised the question of when a private company that is commissioned by the Court Administration 
to construct a database of judicial decisions, to index these decisions, and to make them 
accessible to search engines, can be held accountable for alleged harms arising from its 
practices? Outpacing the issue required not only addressing the right to privacy of litigants 
whose cases were recorded in the database, but also addressing the nature of the public’s right to 
access government data, including data concerning any kind of litigation taking part in any court. 
The weighty, fundamental nature of these issues steered the Israeli Association for Civil Rights 
and the Digital Rights Movement to apply for the Court’s permission to join the proceedings as 
amicus curiae. 
 
The Court was facing a novel social and technological reality, in which new harms not yet 
conceptualized had to be addressed. The Court had to balance between various interests ––the 
right to privacy and the freedom to access government data, the right of possessing personal 
property and the freedom of occupation, the public nature of court proceedings and the right of 
public access to courts. Reaching an optimal balance required informed knowledge of the ways 
search engines and legal databases operate and of search engine optimization techniques. The 
Court had to address technological and legal terms, such as “the right to be forgotten,” that were 
unheard of only a few years earlier. Indeed, Justice Rubinstein duly remarked that, “Law pursues 
technological advances, and the problems they present, but can never catch up,”18 and, “Today’s 
abstract thoughts are tomorrow’s reality.”19  
 
As a veteran judge, during most of Justice Rubinstein’s years on the court, litigants enjoyed, due 
to the limited distribution of published judgments and the inexistence of digital search engines, 
almost full anonymity. Yet, during the last decade, a new space was gradually constituted, 
involving several actors –– the private company who owns and operates the search engine of the 
legal database; the global corporation (whether Bing, Google or any other) that controls the 
cyber highway; the user that might be harmed if he or she will not be able to access data; the 
litigant who might be harmed in several ways if his or hers name easily comes up in an internet 
search, revealing his or her most intimate affairs; and lastly, the state, in whose interest it is to 
regulate the issue in a way that will optimally balance between the conflicting interests. Each and 
every actor within this space might be harmed or harm others. And yet, in spite of this 
complexity, the Court delved into this new space and endeavored to produce intricate balances 
and new protections against newly conceptualized harms.  
 
The Court ruling allowed for the indexing of judgments while illustrating the potential harms to 
litigants, many of whom will be constantly exposed to the public eye, as well as ways to prevent 
harms or reduce them. The text of the decision demonstrates how it is possible to conceptualize, 
                                                 
16 HCJ 5870/14 Hashavim H.P.S. Business Information Ltd. v. Court Administration (2015) (Isr.).  
17  The Israeli Supreme Court is primarily an appellate instance over all other courts. It also serves as a 
High Court of Justice –– a first instance deciding in matters regarding the legality and constitutionality of 
decisions of State authorities.  
18 HCJ 5870/14 Hashavim H.P.S. Business Information Ltd. v. Court Administration (2015) (Isr.) 
(Rubinstein, J., concurring).  
19  Id.  
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in legal language, different harms, relevant to different players, while taking into account a 
variety of situations in which different agents might be harmed or harm others. 
 
However, as we put forward here, while courts managed to conceptualize technology related 
harms,  other harms deeply rooted in human history,  have somehow escaped a scrutinizing legal 
gaze and judicial conceptualization. For example, consider pornography. 
 
For many years, the legal regulation of pornography echoed moralistic narrative, losing most of 
its relevance in a liberal era, in which courts typically refrain from favoring one moral over 
another. Consequently, a call evolved to replace the moralistic narrative with narrative of harm. 
In her research “The Price We Pay? Pornography and Harm,”20 Susan Brison describes how the 
harms of pornography outweigh liberal reasoning in favor of freely producing and distributing 
porn. Among other things, Brison mentions data elaborating how pornography, which drives 
many people to take sexual violence lightly, harms the entire society.21 Along those lines, 
Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon have argued that the harms of pornography require 
legislation that would limit its distribution.22 This view led to new secondary legislation (which 
was later abolished).23 
 
Pornography, centering on images of men and women (mostly women) as objects, available for 
sexual use and allegedly abuse, naturally leads towards the core issue of this paper:  pointing out 
new ways which the law should and employ in order to address the harms of prostitution. 
 
It seems that the harms inherent to prostitution are even more tangible than the harms attributed 
to pornography. A diverse body of research shows that women in prostitution are frequently 
exposed to verbal and physical violence. The percentage of women in prostitution who fall 
victim to verbal abuse, rape, armed robberies or assaults is much higher than among women who 
do not engage in prostitution.24 A series of physical problems characterize prostitution: venereal 
diseases, gynecological problems, oral health problems, and more. According to various studies, 
prostitution often leads to emotional pain and distress, traumatic injury, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.25 Research shows that there are no significant differences between the harms caused to 
different types of women in prostitution: those who engage in prostitution in the street, in 
apartments or in brothels are similarly harmed.26 
                                                 
20 Susan J. Brison, The Price We Pay: Pornography and Harm, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN 
APPLIED ETHICS 236 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath-Welman eds., 2005). 
21 See e.g. THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA & 
PORNOGRAPHY (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995). 
22 IN HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOPGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS (Catherine A. MacKinnon & 
Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997). 
23 Rebecca Benson, Pornography and the First Amendment: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 9 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L. J. 153, 162 (1986). 
24 See Ameporn Ratinthorn, Afaf Meleis & Siriorn Sindhu, Trapped in Circle of Threats: Violence 
Against Sex Workers in Thailand, 30 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L. 249 (2009). 
25 See Cathy Zimmerman et al., The Health of Trafficked Women: A Survey of Women Entering 
Posttrafficking Services in Europe, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 55, 56-57 (2008).  
26 See BBC ONLINE NETWORK, Most Prostitutes are Psychologically Shell Shocked BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 19, 1998), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/154140.stm. 
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These harms, although relevant to many, if not most, women in prostitution, can be categorized 
as individual or subjective harms. Their exact nature and intensity depend on the individual 
circumstances of each woman –– her good or bad luck if you will. Alongside recognition of 
these harms, it is important to draw attention to another type of harm pertaining to prostitution –– 
an objective harm caused not only to some or most of the women in prostitution, but to all of 
them. This harm is the social infamy “tax.” 
 
The social infamy tax entails converting one’s individual identity into the one-dimensional 
identity of a “whore” or a “prostitute”, which engrosses all other dimensions of one’s personal 
self. The term “tax” is meant to emphasize the obligatory aspect of the social infamy harm. This 
harm is the consequence of social construction. It is not related to a woman’s inner perception of 
herself, her engagement in prostitution, or her personal experience. The social infamy is cast 
upon her no matter what she personally experiences. It represents a cold, permanent external 
gaze. A woman in prostitution will never be able to shake off her identity as a whore and the 
inherent social infamy and return unharmed to her previous identity, free of social infamy, unless 
she can cover any trace of her past as a prostitute –– a task that is often impossible.27 The social 
infamy tax is, in actual fact, a massive, irreversible harm.  
 
And yet, in contrast to the litigant whose case has been made digitally available, women in 
prostitution’s harms are neither conceptualized nor recognized by law. Their harms remain 
transparent, and the legal gaze misses them.  
  
Time and again the legal system fails, or perhaps avoids, a comprehensive conceptualization of 
women in prostitution’s situation and the harms caused to them. Next, we will demonstrate, by 
presenting a number of recent Israeli cases dealing with women in prostitution, the ways in 
which the courts avoid, in a variety of ways, investigating the full meaning of prostitution’s 
harms. 
 
The judgments we will review, dealing with women in prostitution as victims of offenses, or 
women in prostitution as accused of committing offenses, reflect the ambivalence and the moral 
and ideological confusion that characterizes how society views prostitution.28 The stories 
unveiled in them reveal the awkward nature of legal attempts to deal with the meaning of 
prostitution, particularly in criminal law.29 
                                                 
27Shulamit Almog, Prostitution as Exploitation: An Israeli Perspective, 11 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 711, 739 (2010). 
28 Id. at 717.  
29 In this article, we focus on examples from criminal law in Israeli jurisprudence. However, judicial 
ambivalence regarding the perception of prostitution exists in almost all branches of the law. For 
example, Israeli labor courts place a significant emphasis on the free will component as an indicator of the 
existence of employer-employee relations. However, on the other hand, courts have found it difficult to 
quantify the proper salary of women in prostitution or the compensation component due to them. See e.g., 
2852/05 (Jm.) Anonymous v. Anonymous, (2007) (Isr.); 480/05 N.L.C Ben Shitrit v. Anonymous, (2008) 
(Isr.); 247/07 (N.L.C) Anonymous v. Kuchic, (2009) (Isr.); Cf. CA 11152/04 A v. Migdal Insurance 
Company Ltd., (2006) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/520/111/p19/04111520 .p19.pdf 
(overturning an award of tort damages that were supposed to finance prostitution services for victims of 
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III. WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION AS CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 
 
One of the harms of prostitution is the often unavoidable trail that frequently leads women in 
prostitution towards activities defined as criminal.30 Mary Gilfus describes how, for women in 
prostitution, the most readily available option to escape physical and sexual violence often leads 
them to acts defined as criminal.31 An Israeli ruling by Nazareth’s District Court poignantly 
illustrates this outline.32  
 
A., an Argentine-born woman arrived in Israel with her ex-husband and four children after 
suffering years of familial alienation. 33 In Israel, she found no solace. It was extremely difficult 
for her to adjust to the new circumstances. Gradually she lost her ability to take care of her 
children.  The welfare agencies intervened, took custody of the children and assigned them into 
out-of-home settings. Her emotional state deteriorated, and so did her ability to provide for 
herself. At the age of 54, A. began to engage in prostitution. Six to seven men, some of them 
minors aged 14 and 13, came to her apartment on a daily basis and had intercourse with her.  
 
A. was convicted of having sexual relations with minors. This is how the facts are described in 
A.’s sentencing: “Each of the minors entered the defendant’s apartment in turn, and stripped off 
his clothes ... afterwards every minor inserted his penis into the defendant’s vagina.”34 
Following a plea bargain, A., the Court convicted A., using the same legal framework pertinent 
to cases of male sex offenders, whose actions are mostly the result of sexual pathology.35 
However, as we maintain, what happened in A.’s apartment reflects a very different pathology, 
suggesting gang rape, in which the penetrated person is the victim rather than the offender. The 
minors contacted A. on their own initiative, arriving at her apartment as a group, taking turns to 
have intercourse with her, one after the other. Minors the age of her children used her body to 
satisfy their sexual and social needs, perhaps to be able to tell that “they are no longer virgins” 
and “they have been with a whore.”36 Indeed, the minors were under the age of consent under 
                                                                                                                                                             
vehicular accidents because such compensation was contrary to public policy); Shulamit Almog, 
Prostitution as Exploitation: An Israeli Perspective, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 711, 739 (2010) 
(providing a discussion of Israeli labor and civil court’s ambivalence regarding women in prostitution).   
30 See SUSAN DEWEY & TONIA ST. GERMAIN, WOMEN OF THE STREET: HOW THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE - SOCIAL SERVICES ALLIANCE FAILS WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION (2017) (discussing the 
problematic interface between the law enforcement system and women in prostitution). 
31 Mary E. Gilfus, From Victims to Survivors to Offender, 4 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 63 (1993); See 
GILA CHEN & TOMER EINAV, WOMEN’S PRISON: THE BACK-DOOR OF THE SOCIETY IN ISRAEL 
(2010) (describing a similar state of affairs in Israel).  
32  CrimC (Nz.) 16283-12-14 State of Israel v. Anonymous (2014) (Isr.).  
33  The case law does not mention the woman’s name and refers to her as “the defendant”. Id.   
34 Id. at § 9-11. 
35 A. was the subject of a clinical ’dangerousness assessment’ required by the Protection of the Public 
from Sex Offenders Law at art. 6, 2006. Id. at § 15-19. 
36 Pamela C. Regan & Carla S. Dreyer, Lust? Love? Status? Young Adults’ Motives for Engaging in 
Casual Sex, 11 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM. SEXUALITY 1 (1999); see Laura M. Carpenter, The Ambiguity of 
“Having Sex”: The Subjective Experience of Virginity Loss in the United States, 38 J. SEX RESEARCH 
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Israeli law, and rightly viewed as victims by the Israeli justice system. But they are not the only 
victims in A.'s case.  
 
It seems that in this case, the legal system employed the routine “tool box” for sex offenders 
without considering how suitable it was in A.’s circumstances. Professionals examined A., 
assessing her empathy toward the minors and the harm caused to them, her understanding of the 
moral wrongs in her actions, and her refusal to engage in therapy.37 But the Court did not wonder 
how A. could be expected, for example, to take part in meetings of a support group for sex 
offenders and share her difficulties in overcoming her apparent attraction to minors? Indeed, as 
the circumstances of the case illustrate, A. needs much more than “therapy.” She needs help and 
guidance in the form of economic and psychological support. In the absence of all of these, A. 
will return to sell her body to anyone willing to pay, and will continue, like most women in 
prostitution, to be emotionally cut off from the situation. The probation service’s position that 
“there is a significant risk of recurrence of similar cases in the future” is indeed realistic, but 
nevertheless did not result in a recommendation to grant her the support she needs.38 
 
As a sex offender, the system subjected A. to a clinical “dangerousness assessment” required by 
article 6 of the Protection of the Public from Sex Offenders Law, 5766 – 2006 (“Protection of the 
Public law”). This assessment established that A. is “manipulative, unreliable, impulsive, 
viewing herself as a victim, has difficulties in managing anger and setting borders, and blames 
the complainants for having unprotected sex.”39 In addition, the assessment noted that A. “has a 
good understanding that her actions are wrong . . . but feels she harmed mostly herself, her 
reputation . . . . She is taking formal responsibility for her actions, but does not believe that she 
caused anyone else any harm.”40 This paragraph clearly indicates A.’s harms as a woman in 
prostitution, the social infamy she is burdened with, and the fear that her time in prostitution will 
cloud the rest of her life. 
 
Should the Court have taken into account the circumstances of A.’s life, her harms as a woman 
in prostitution, the social infamy tax she will pay all her life and the fact that she perceived the 
minors in the same way she perceived any other johns arriving at her apartment? In our opinion, 
an in-depth examination of the situation cannot take place without taking these factors into 
account. In view of the circumstances described in detail in the judgment, it is less likely to 
expect A. to empathize with the minors and the way she harmed them, rather than expect the 
legal system and society at large to empathize with A., who was caught up in the harmful 
territory of prostitution. 
 
The Court’s ruling indicates some awareness to the full meaning of the circumstances. These are 
the words of Justice Binyamin Arbel: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
127 (2001) (discussing the positive social value of losing one’s virginity for men and the negative social 
value for women).  
37 CrimC (Nz.) 16283-12-14 State of Israel v. Anonymous, at § 8-19 (2014) (Isr.).  
38  The Service’s recommendation is standard and is customary in cases in which the defendants do not 
take responsibility for their actions to impose harsh, boundary setting punishment. Id. at § 14-15. 
39 Id. at § 15. 
40 Id. at § 16. 
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        I am of the opinion that when the defendant had sex with her clients, including the 
minors, she did so on the background of the economic duress she faced following her 
separation from her spouse, and not because she planned to have sex with minors. ... We 
have no indication of harm incurred to them, physically or mentally. We have not even 
heard any arguments that could scientifically teach us what is the harm to male minors, as 
opposed to female minors, from exposure to acts of the kind that were committed in the 
case before us. In addition, the material before us does not indicate that the accused used41 
any means of soliciting that caused the minors to fall into her net. On the contrary, the 
probation report indicates that the defendant was indifferent to the age of her clients. These 
clients turned to her on their own initiative ... The minors –– who cannot statutorily 
consent –– initiated the encounters to satisfy their wants, whether curiosity or sexual 
desire, while the defendant’s wanted financial gains. 42 
 
As clearly illustrated by this paragraph, A. is also the victim of the complainants, who exploited 
her weakness to satisfy their sexual needs. Under this background, the court rejected the state’s 
demand that A. be sentenced to at least 18 months in prison,  yet sentenced her to six months of 
community service, while noting that the punishment was necessary in order to deter her from 
repeating the acts and to express “society’s aversion to her actions.”42 
 
Israeli penal law allows courts to take into account the personal circumstances of the offender at 
the time of the sentence. The Court indeed took into account A.’s divorce, A.’s low cognitive 
capacities, the way A. was harmed by the criminal charges against her, and A.’s clean criminal 
record, but it did not refer to her mere being a woman in prostitution as a mitigating 
circumstance.  
 
The difference between the rhetoric and the practice of the Court in this particular case is a 
manifestation of the current inability of the Israeli court system to conceptualize and take into 
account the harms inherent to women in prostitution. Eventually, the woman whose plight was 
lamented by the Court, whose unfortunate life was reviewed in detail, is treated no differently 
than a common sex offender. The Court sentences her for an offense that did not cause harm to 
anyone but herself, while at the same time expressing aversion to her actions. 
 
Let us now examine another ruling, given by the Israeli Supreme Court in the matter of 
Kumashin v. State of Israel.43 Two women in prostitution –– Anna and Marina, Ukrainian 
citizens who had been living in Israel for several years –– were convicted of premeditated 
murder. According to the verdict, the two arrived at the victim’s apartment, where the three 
consumed alcohol. The two women put drugs into the deceased’s glass. While the three were in 
bed, Anna and Marina strangled the deceased with a pillow, and caused his death by stabbing 
him with a knife, wrapping a plastic bag around his neck, and setting his body on fire. They were 
convicted, and each was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
                                                 
41 Id. at § 38. 
42 Id.  
42 Id. at § 44. 
43 CrimA 8512/14 Kumashin v. State of Israel (2016) (Isr.).  
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We would like to focus on one argument raised by Anna and Marina, involving article 300A(c) 
of the Israeli Penal Law 5737-1977. This article, referred to as the diminished capacity defense, 
allows the court to reduce the sentence of a person convicted of murder when the defendant was 
in a state of severe mental distress due to the severe and prolonged abuse inflicted by the victim. 
Defense counsel argued that Anna and Marina's  harsh circumstances, which included abuse by 
many men –– both clients and pimps –– should be considered as prolonged abuse, thus rendering 
their clients’ murder into a slaying of their abuser, paving the way to a valid diminished capacity 
defense and consequently reduced sentence.44 The Court curtly rejected this argument, stating 
that there was no evidentiary basis to substantiate the claim that the circumstances of the 
defendants’ harsh life led them to prostitution or that they were in a “state of severe mental 
distress” when they were with the deceased.45 It was further determined that, even if defendant’s 
claim were to be accepted, it was undisputed that the deceased never harmed the defendants and 
had nothing to do with their mental state, and it was unclear from the defendants why their anger, 
accumulated over the years, erupted against him.46 
 
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, Anna and Marina repeated the diminished capacity 
defense.47 Justice Fogelman discussed it briefly: 
 
      The appellants’ argument should be rejected. The appellants did not meet the burden –– 
which lies upon them –– to show that they were each in a state of severe mental distress; 
that they had suffered severe abuse from the deceased; and that there was a causal link 
between the abuse and their mental state at the time they committed the offenses. I cannot 
accept the appellants’ claim –– which they presumed to support by expert opinion –– that 
the deceased should be regarded as the last link in a chain of abusive factors, and therefore 
should be regarded as the abuser relevant to article 300A(c).48 
 
After rejecting the diminished capacity defense, Justice Fogelman added: 
 
      At the same time, we emphasize that we do not ignore the personal circumstances of 
the appellants. Prostitutes are frequently exposed to a harsh, sometimes cruel reality, often 
involving violence and humiliation. Life experience also indicates that in many cases 
prostitution is a result of difficult and complex life events. However, none of this is 
                                                 
44 To substantiate their position, the defendants provided testimony from Ms. Nomi Levenkron, an expert 
on trafficking women in prostitution, who reviewed the harms of prostitution and the trauma that women 
in prostitution suffer. They also presented the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Yuri Rassovsky, who 
explained that each of the defendants experienced symptoms of anxiety and depression. Dr. Rassovsky 
also diagnosed Anna with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. CrimC (Nz.) 52738-01-12 State of 
Israel v. Kumashin, at § 20 (2014) (per curium) (Isr.).  
45 See THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA & 
PORNOGRAPHY (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995). 
46 Id.  
47The appellants also claimed an intoxication defense which is recognized by Israeli law. According to 
Anna and Marina, they were drunk before and during the crime. The appellants claimed that they are 
addicted to alcohol and use it to numb their senses before having sex with a client. CrimC (Nz.) 52738-
01-12 State of Israel v. Kumashin, at § 16 (per curium).   
48 Id. at § 26. 
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sufficient to attest to the fulfillment of the conditions for the application of article 300A (c) 
of the Penal Law, which requires a detailed factual basis, focusing on a specific victim. 
This was not found in our case, as the District Court has determined.49 
 
Anna and Marina committed heinous, horrifying crimes. However, the diminished capacity 
defense is not intended to be applied solely in regard to slight demeanors. It is intended to be 
applied particularly in regard to serious, even hideous crimes. Yet the Court sufficed with a 
general reference to the harms of prostitution and general acknowledgment of the appellants’ 
difficult life, and easily dismissed the claim of diminished capacity. No attempt was made to 
conduct a comprehensive discussion of the diminished capacity defense in the context of women 
in prostitution that act violently against a client or a potential association between the unique 
harms of prostitution and violent acts committed by women in prostitution.50 The Court in this 
case had evidentiary tools (expert opinions, Anna’s and Marina’s testimony) that enabled 
examining the highly complex issue of a victim who may be the last link in a chain of prolonged 
abuse. Yet instead of an in-depth examination of the applicability of the diminished capacity 
defense in this case, the Court adhered to a strict interpretation of the language of the law, and 
stated that the diminished capacity defense must relate to a particular victim (the emphasis 
appears in the ruling).51 The Court preferred a path that did not require conceptualizing the 
harms of prostitution rather than one that paved new path and drew guidelines relevant to 
situations in which victim to a crime can be considered as “a last link in a chain of abuse.” 
 
The two cases analyzed in this chapter are polar opposites. The case of Anonymous is analyzed 
by the Court as a victimless crime, while in Kumashin the Court is dealing with a horrifying 
murder. A., the accused in Anonymous, engaged in prostitution almost accidentally while Anna 
and Marina, the Kumashin affair offenders, are apparent victims of a life time in which they were 
exploited. Yet, in both cases, the Courts had the chance to hone criminal law norms to the 
defendant’s special circumstances as women in prostitution while at the same time 
conceptualizing and taking those harms into legal account. Instead, the Courts chose to avoid a 
discussion that might lead to such conceptualization.  
 
IV. WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION AS CRIME VICTIMS 
 
A vast body of data points to the frequency of cases in which women in prostitution fall victim to 
various forms of physical and mental harm.52 In light of this, it is not surprising that Israeli 
courts are often required to deal with cases of crimes committed in women in prostitution. We 
                                                 
49 Id.  
50Monster is a film based on the true story of Aileen Caroll Wuornos: a woman in prostitution who later 
became a serial killer. Phyllis Chesler, A Woman’s Right to Self-Defense: The Case of Aileen Carol 
Wuornos, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 933, 946 (1993). The film is a well-known representation of a 
traumatized woman’s narrative. MONSTER (DEJ Productions, 2003).  
51 CrimA 8512/14 Kumashin v. State of Israel § 27 (2016) (Isr.).  
52 See Rochelle L. Dalla, Yan Xia & Heather Kennedy, You Just Give Them What They Want and Pray 
They Don’t Kill You, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1367, 1370 (2003); Charisse T. Coston & Lee E. 
Ross, Criminal Victimization of Prostitutes: Empirical Support for the Lifestyle / Exposure Model, 21 J. 
CRIME & JUST. 53 (1998); Stephanie Church, Marion Henderson & Maria Barnard, Violence by Clients 
Towards Female Prostitutes in Different Settings: Questionnaire Survey, 322 BRIT. MED J. 524 (2001). 
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shall now examine a number of such cases, focusing on the question of the extent to which courts 
consider the special vulnerability of women in prostitution. 
 
The first case is Police Investigation Department v. Al-Huzayl, in which a woman in prostitution 
was sexually harassed by a policeman, while he was on active duty.53 The policeman arrived at 
the place where the victim was sitting with a client in a vehicle, demanded that she return the 
money to the client, and threatened to impose a fine on her. When the victim returned the money 
to the client, the policeman told her that he would refrain from imposing the fine if she gave him 
sex services at a discount. She made it clear to him that she was not interested, and he repeated 
his proposal. The policeman brought her to his car, informed that she was detained, and after a 
short drive and an exchange of insults, returned her to the place from which she was taken.  
 
The policeman agreed to a plea bargain, and admitted he committed offenses of fraud, breach of 
trust, and abuse of his powers as a police officer. The central, most severe offense –– sexual 
harassment –– was removed from the amended indictment54 was removed from the amended 
indictment. He was sentenced to six months of public service labor and a suspended prison 
sentence. Considering even this punishment too severe, he filed an appeal, which was rejected, 
asking that his conviction be annulled and that his sentence be replaced by community service.55 
 
At the hearing of the appeal, the Supreme Court found it appropriate, as is its rhetorical practice 
in such cases, to point out how seriously the Court perceives crimes directed at weak women 
living on the margins of society, who are particularly in need of the protection.56 The Court even 
repeated a verbal formula that appears almost routinely in rulings dealing with women in 
prostitution: “Life in prostitution does not make a woman’s body unprotected.”57 
 
Against this background, the plea bargain and the lenient punishment are startling. The 
complainant submitted a letter to the Court in which she stated that mitigation of the appellant’s 
sentence would undermine her belief that “the law protects me as well.”58 This sad statement 
illustrates the sense of lack of protection (both police protection and court protection) that 
women in prostitution experience. In practice, the Court chose to reach a generous plea bargain 
with an officer of the law who abused his power in a way that deepened the humiliation of a 
woman in prostitution.  
 
                                                 
53CrimC 54377-12-14 Police Investigation Department v. Al-Huzayl (2015) (Isr.).  
54Sexual harassment is defined as the “repeated propositions of a sexual nature, addressed to a person 
who has demonstrated to the harasser that he is not interested in the said propositions”. Prevention Sexual 
Harassment Law, art. 3(a)(3), 1998.  
55 In Israeli law, community service is considered a lighter punishment than service labor. Penal Law 
5737-1977, art. 71(a) (1997).  
56 CrimA 3721/16 Al-Huzayl v. State of Israel (2017) (Isr.).   
57Israeli Supreme Court has applied a similar formula in cases with victims who are women in 
prostitution. Cf. CrimA 1641/94 Asulin v. State of Israel § 5 (1994) (per curium) (Isr.) (“A street walker 
is entitled to the law’s defense of her freedom and dignity, even though she engages in vile practices”); 
CrimA 9687/11 Syuri v. State of Israel (2013) (Isr.) (“A prostitute is entitled, as is any other woman, to 
have her dignity and her physical and mental integrity protected by law”) (Arbel, J., concurring).  
58 CrimA 3721/16 Al-Huzayl v. State of Israel § 10 (2017) (Isr.) (per curium).  
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Another example that illustrates the ambivalence of the Court toward women in prostitution and 
their harms is the case of State of Israel v. Abou Guilyon.59 The complainant, a woman in 
prostitution in her 40’s who immigrated to Israel on her own at the age of 20, met the defendant 
on the street and agreed to have sex with him for 200 NIS.60 The defendant knew at the time that 
he did not have the money. When they arrived at his apartment, he refused to pay, and an 
argument erupted. At one point, the defendant threw the complainant on the mattress and began 
to undress her by force, hitting and bruising her. As a result of his violence, the complainant 
agreed to perform oral sex on the defendant. Eventually, the defendant ceased his actions, asked 
for the complainant’s forgiveness, and the two got dressed. Later, the defendant ordered the 
complainant to take off her clothes. The complainant, who was afraid of the defendant, lay down 
on the bed, and the defendant rubbed his penis against her vagina and then turned her on her 
stomach and inserted his penis into her anus until he climaxed.  
 
In the District Court, the defendant was convicted, after agreeing to a plea bargain, of 
committing the offenses of sodomy and indecent acts.61 In its verdict, the Court indicated the 
severity of the acts and, as is customary, set out the adamant standing of Israeli courts regarding 
offenses against women in prostitution. In addition, the Court referred to a report relating to the 
state of the victim (presented to the Court before sentencing according to Israeli criminal 
procedure law) indicating that she suffers from depression, sleep disorders, and chronic 
headaches. It was further asserted that the complainant experienced humiliation and aggravated 
abuse in the wake of the present event, and that the most significant harm caused to her as a 
result of the defendant’s actions was a mental injury: anxieties and obsessive thoughts that shook 
her faith in her ability to cope with her life.62 Against this background, Justice Tamar Naot-Perry 
writes: 
 
          Another circumstance to consider is the harm caused by the offense. In this case, in 
view of the report regarding the state of the victim, she will suffer from mental damage in 
the future, accumulating to her fragile emotional state before the events. In this sense she 
should be considered a “thin skull.”63 
 
Here, Justice Naot-Perry is proposing that Israeli courts will employ the thin skull doctrine while 
dealing with cases of women in prostitution who are victims of an offense. This term is taken 
from the Israeli law of torts, and means that the tortfeasor meets the injured person as is, and if 
the victim was unusually sensitive to a certain type of damage, the tortfeasor should have 
expected it and will not escape liability on the basis of the victim's unique vulnerability.64 This 
                                                 
59 CrimC (Hi) 8086-10-14 State of Israel v. Abou Guilyon, (2015) (Isr.).  
60This is equal to approximatley   fifty-dollars in the United States.  
61  Id. at § 1- 4. Sodomy is defined as “introduction of a bodily organ or an object into a person’s anus, or 
introduction of a sex organ into a person’s mouth” and can be punishable with a maximum sentence of 
16-20 years imprisonment. Penal Law 5737-1977, 1997 at art. 347(c). Whereas, an indecent act is defined 
as “an act for sexual arousal, satisfaction or abasement” and punishable with a maximum sentence of 7 
years. Id. at 348(e).  
62CrimC (Hi) 8086-10-14 State of Israel v. Abou Guilyon, § 6 (2015) (Isr.).  
63 Id. at § 23. 
64This principle is rooted in the common law. See Smith v Leech Brain & Co (1962) QB 405 (UK) 
(applying the principle in a UK case); see F.H. 12/63 Leon v. Ringer 18(4) PD 701 (1964) (Isr.) (applying 
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principle is applied in criminal law, where it serves as a substitute for the requirement of 
subjective expectations of a certain result in cases of a resultant offense.65 The District Court’s 
opinion thus implies that clients committing crimes against women in prostitution can expect to 
cause an increased range of harms and injuries, beyond those caused to women who are not in 
prostitution. In light of all this, the Court sentenced the defendant to 11 years in prison, in 
addition to requiring him to pay the complainant the sum of 50,000 NIS (about 12.000$). 
 
The Supreme Court, in its ruling in Abou-Guilyon’s appeal regarding the severity of the 
punishment,66 noted the importance of protecting women in prostitution who are “easy prey” for 
sexual offenses. However, despite expressing the routine general condemnation of sex crimes 
against women in prostitution, the Supreme Court reduced the appellant’s sentence by two 
years.67  
The Court reasoned that the defendant confessed as part of a plea bargain and that the sentence 
imposed on the appellant was exceptionally harsh in relation to plea bargains under similar 
circumstances.68 The Supreme Court did not address the fact that the matter of the admittance 
had already been addressed in the District Court’s ruling. The admittance was part of the plea 
bargain, and resulted in a mitigated sentence in the District Court. The Supreme Court granted 
further mitigation, thus forming a gap between the rhetoric used by the Court regarding the need 
to unwaveringly protect women in prostitution and the leniency in regard to the defendant’s 
punishment.  
 
In the Abou Guilyon case, the District Court proposed to see the damage done to women in 
prostitution through thin skull lenses. It should be noted that courts employ this principle not 
while determining guilt, but in the stage of sentencing.69  
 
We propose that the path outlined by the District Court in the Abou Guilyon case should be 
developed in order to impose increased liability on offenders when the victims are women in 
prostitution. Acknowledging the relevance of the thin skull doctrine in such cases may 
significantly reinforce the victim’s status.70 It will provide greater deterrence on the one hand, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the principle in an Israeli tort case); CA 8279/02 Golan v. The Estate of Dr. Menachem Albert 62(1) PD 
330 (2006) (Isr.) (applying the principle in an Israeli tort case).  
65 See e.g., CA 6294/11 Anonymous v. State of Israel (2014) (Isr.); CA 707/83 Petromilio v. State of 
Israel, 38(4) PD 821 (1984) (Isr.).  
66 CrimA 1630/15 Abou-Guilyon v. State of Israel (2016) (Isr.).  
67  See CrimA 3011/13 Saaida v. State of Israel (2015) (Isr.) (district court expressed the harms caused to 
women in prostitution while the Supreme Court mitigated punishment).  
68 CrimA 1630/15 Abou-Guilyon v. State of Israel § 32 (2016) (Isr.). 
69 See e.g., CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State of Israel (2016) (Isr.) (thin skull lenses principle was used to 
determine guilt when a defendant caused the death of a female prostitute). 
70 For the importance of strengthening the status of the victim within the framework of the criminal 
proceeding and the purpose of compensating the victim, see CrimA 6452/09 Ali v. State of Israel (2010) 
(Isr.); CrimA 6237/12 Joulani v. State of Israel, § 32 (2016) (Isr.).  
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and a much sought after recognition of the distinctive harm of victimized women in prostitution 
on the other.71  
 
We shall now turn to our last case,72 in which the Israeli Supreme Court considered the appeal of 
Marwan Morah, found by the District Court to be guilty for the manslaughter of Victoria K., a 
woman in prostitution who jumped to her death from the balcony of his home. The question was 
whether the appellant could have expected that the deceased would jump from the balcony, given 
the fact that prior to her doing so an apparently violent argument between the two about the 
matter of payment took place, as well as the fact that she was under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol. In addition, it was argued that appellant blocked Victoria’s way out of his apartment (the 
appellant revealed this detail in his testimony in the police, but later recanted his testimony), 
leaving her with no alternative but to jump off the balcony. Another fact that was taken into 
account was that after Victoria jumped off the balcony, which was located on the second floor, 
the appellant went out of his house, passed by her, and did not help her, but wandered the streets 
to cover his tracks. 
 
The District Court ruled that the defendant had caused Victoria’s fall from the balcony –– 
whether by pushing her or otherwise –– and convicted him of manslaughter and obstruction of 
justice for trying to destroy evidence of his connection to the case.73 He appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court ruled in his favor, determining that the District Court findings were 
not based on evidence, which it found showed, at the most, that the appellant caused Victoria’s 
death by negligence. To determine negligence, the Court asked whether a reasonable person 
could have expected, under the circumstances that Victoria would try to leave the apartment by 
jumping off the balcony.  
 
The Court referred to a number of questions arising from the circumstantial evidence, including 
the existence of a violent struggle between the two before the deceased leaped from the balcony; 
what the deceased wore before the jump; the exit route from the house to the balcony; and 
whether the appellant blocked her way out of the apartment. After examining the entire body of 
evidence, the two majority judges –– Justice Menachem Mazuz and Justice Salim Joubran –– 
determined that the appellant should be acquitted of manslaughter, but affirmed his conviction 
for obstruction of justice. The minority judge –– Justice Noam Solberg –– found that the 
appellant should be acquitted of manslaughter but convicted of negligent manslaughter. 
 
We will not dwell on the legal analysis presented by the Supreme Court and the evidence it 
relates to, but rather focus on the main point that emerges, in our reading,  from the Supreme 
Court’s analysis –– the lack of adequate conceptualization of the special harms caused to women 
in prostitution.  
 
This point is echoed in a number of key points in the judgment. It is clear that the Court did not 
analyze the situation through the imagined perspective of a traumatic woman in prostitution, but 
                                                 
71 See CrimC (Nz.) 5893-06-12 State of Israel v. Saaida, at § 32 (2013) (Isr.) (applying the “thin skull 
principle”); CrimA 1864/11 Davidov v. State of Israel, at § 8 (2012) (Isr.) (applying the thin skull 
principle in sentencing when the victim was an elderly person).  
72CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State of Israel (2016) (Isr.).  
73 CrimC (TA) 20998-08-13 State of Israel v. Morah (2014) (Isr.).  
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rather through the perspective of conventional life experience, or a life that is perceived as 
reasonable. For example, the Court wondered why, if the two did have a violent argument, 
Victoria did not simply defend herself rather than jump off the balcony, especially because, 
according to the evidence, she had a violent nature. However, the Court ignored the fact that the 
evidence presented did not indicate that Victoria was inherently violent, but that she had 
acquired certain survival skills in order to cope with the violent world in which she lived. The 
Court also ignored the testimony of Victoria’s friends that in the last years of her life she 
developed a drug addiction, which caused her to lose her assertive nature. Her close friend used 
the phrase “she was like a rag”. Could a woman who was so seriously harmed act with 
determination and force when violence is used against her? In our opinion, a full 
conceptualization of the harms inherent to prostitution leads towards a negative answer. 
 
The Court analyzed Victoria’s jump from the balcony as a suicidal act rather than an attempted 
escape from the apartment. The court brought up an analogy to the Yaakobov case,74 in which a 
man was accused of causing the death of his wife, who jumped to her death after years of 
physical abuse, stating that, “In the present case, the deceased was not in a state of special or 
exceptional distress, or deep despair, which justified or might have caused an expectation of such 
an extreme action.”75  
 
This statement reflects the distance between the Court and the realities of women in prostitution 
lives. Women in prostitution constitute a specific subgroup of women who are exposed to 
chronic and ongoing abuse.  Recognition of the significant potential of harm caused by 
prostitution, especially the perception of prostitution as a continuous traumatic experience, is 
essential for determining the attitude of law towards prostitution. Existing data indicates that 
there are direct links between trauma and prostitution76, in that most women who are addicted to 
drugs or engage in prostitution have been victims of incest or sexual abuse have fled from their 
homes, and/or are easy prey to pimps who led them to drugs and prostitution.77 Against this 
background, it is difficult to accept the Court’s decision that Victoria was not in a state of special 
distress. 
 
The Court also discussed whether a reasonable person would have predicted that a person would 
jump to his or her death in the course of a specific dispute.78 However, in this case, the appellant 
was not a reasonable man, but rather a man who paid for sex; and it was not an ordinary person 
who jumped to her death due to a specific conflict –– it was a woman in prostitution, who died in 
                                                 
74 CFA 983/02 Yaakobov v. State of Israel 56(4) PD 385 (2002) (Isr.).  
75 CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State of Israel (2016) (Isr.) § 39 (per curium).  
76 See Monica O’Connor, Choice, Agency Consent and Coercion: Complex Issues in the Lives of 
Prostituted and Trafficked Women, WOMEN’S STUDIES INT’L FORUM 62 (2017). 
77 Research indicates that the first sexual experience for women in prostitution is often at a very early age 
and often caused by rape. Most adult women in prostitution were sexually abused during their childhood 
by a stepfather or father and were victims of abuse and neglect within their families. See Vednita Carter & 
Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitution, Racism and Feminist Discourse, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. R. 37 
(1999); Melissa Farley & Howard Barkan, Prostitution, Violence and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 27 
WOMEN’S HEALTH 37 (1998). 
78 CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State of Israel (2016) (Isr.) (J. Jubran, concurring).  
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her attempt to escape from the client’s apartment. It is clear that the judges placed themselves in 
the same situation, and wondered whether they would have done so in similar circumstances.  
 
It seems that the Court envisions a normal situation –– an ordinary woman or man who engages 
in an argument with someone about something, and in the middle of the argument suddenly 
decides to jump off the balcony. In such a case, it is clear that the deceased is solely responsible 
for his or her own death, his or her response being extreme, irrational, and disproportionate.79 
But this is not the case here. In fact, the Court’s approach here reflects the basic approach of 
Israeli law, which treats prostitution as a species of contract law –– a woman in prostitution and a 
man buying sex are perceived as parties to a legitimate contractual deal. The contractual 
approach to prostitution defines the phenomenon as an activity that is primarily a transaction 
centered on free trade between a client and a woman providing sexual services, and is not 
fundamentally different from any contract of employment or provision of other services.80 As we 
shall see below, this approach is detached from the harsh realities of the world of prostitution. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: HARM IS HARM IS HARM. 
 
Like many other court rulings, the last ruling we discussed tells a story. It is about Victoria K., a 
prostitute who, during a business argument, and while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, 
tragically fell to her death off a second floor balcony. These are the circumstances that led to 
Victoria’s death, according to the Supreme Court’s majority ruling:81 
 
1. The deceased came to the appellant’s apartment in order to have sex with him, in exchange for 
money. 
2.  At some stage an argument broke between the two. According to one of the appellant’s 
versions, a version he later renounced in his testimony, he blocked her way out from leaving the 
apartment. Up to this point, there is no evidence of violence. 
3. The deceased was under the combined influence of high doses of alcohol and drugs that 
influenced her state of mind and made her feel exited, very self-confident, and elated. 
4. The deceased, partly dressed and with her bag on her arm, went out to the terrace, and jumped 
to her death.  
 
We believe that Victoria K. deserves a richer story, story that will attempt to imagine her past 
and her life, to see the situation through her eyes.  If such story would have been created, the 
                                                 
79 However, it is interesting to see the Court envisions a similar situation, in which the appellant is the one 
who flees. In Morah v. State of Israel, the Court blames Victoria for her own death by consuming alcohol 
and drugs which led her to behave unexpectedly and jump off the balcony. CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State 
of Israel § 39-38 (2016) (Isr.) (“... his demand from the deceased to stay in the apartment despite her 
request to leave, and possibly blocking her way out, apparently contributed, in addition to the lethal mix 
of drugs and alcohol, to the deceased deeds that led to her tragic death, and the appellant instead of calling 
the authorities and calling for help, threw away any objects related to the deceased from his house, fled 
from his apartment and at first refrained from cooperating in his interrogation.”) (per curium).  
80 See Sybil Schwarzenbach, Contractarians and Feminists Debate Prostitution, in PROSTITUTION & 
PORNOGRAPHY: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ABOUT THE SEX INDUSTRY 209, 211 (Jessica Spector ed., 2006). 
81 CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State of Israel § 26 (2016) (per curium) (Isr.).  
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court would not have been able, for example, to write the next paragraph, which appeared in the 
judgment: 
 
         Objectively, in contrast to the circumstances surrounding Yaakobov, the deceased in 
our case was not in a situation of special or exceptional distress, or deep despair, which 
justified or might have been enabled one to expect such an extreme reaction. This was a 
dispute with a client about additional payment for sexual services rendered, of the type 
that was presumably not alien to the deceased (who, according to the testimony, often 
resorted to violence against her clients)...82 
 
According to our contention, it should clearly be stated that being in prostitution causes, in many 
cases, special or unusual distress. A common situation in the lives of many women in 
prostitution is deep despair. And even more so when a woman in prostitution is addicted to 
drugs, as Victoria was. What seems to the judge as extreme and unobservable behavior is 
sometimes the only way of escape, and thus what can reasonably be expected from a woman 
who has one purpose: to survive. 
 
It is not blindness that prevents the courts from conceptualizing the harms of women in 
prostitution while at the same time coming up with innovative ways to conceptualize the plethora 
of varied types of harms that exist elsewhere in human lives. Multilayered and complex social 
mechanisms are at work here, mechanisms that preserve the existing patriarchal structure and 
normalize it in a way that makes it very difficult to see reality differently than the way it is seen 
by the courts. It is difficult to expect judges to break through the system’s invisible constructs. 
Perhaps it is especially difficult when dealing with prostitution. The social infamy around 
prostitution stifles the ability to imagine prostitution first and foremost as harm. However, a 
judge can be expected to use emotion and empathy when discussing a case in which a woman in 
prostitution is involved, whether as a victim or as an offender. This will enable the courts to use 
the innovation and imagination that they use in any other context that requires harms to be 
conceptualized.  
 
The facts of Victoria's case were determined by the Supreme Court. We do not presume to 
question these facts. But we will draw an additional narrative, delineating a path the Court did 
not take. This is our story, which is told from the imagined point of view of Victoria, giving her a 
voice that she was not given in the rulings of both instances.  
 
           It is an unbearably hot and humid Israeli summer night. She stands at her usual 
corner in a dark street at the south of Tel-Aviv. Her thoughts ramble between missing her 
daughter, whom she has not met even once during the last three years, and wandering 
where she might spend the night. It is the hour when men go out for prostitutes. She is 
waiting for one, whoever he will be. 
          She feels merely distress, not fear. She knows johns well. Those that refuse to pay, 
those that argue, those that seem fine but turn into abusers the minute you are alone with 
them. A few years earlier everything seemed different. She was stronger then, and more 
assertive, able to reserve some dignity. All her friends know she can take care of herself. 
                                                 
82 CrimA 149/15 Morah v. State of Israel § 39 (2016) (per curium) (Isr.).   
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They all knew about the criminal offenses she collected just by refusing to remain silent 
and passive… that time where she stabbed someone who insulted her. Yes, once she was 
able to deal with violent men. But during the last few years she has turned into a wreck. 
The booze and the drugs and the years passing by –– next year she will be 50 –– have 
claimed their heavy toll. The estrangement from her daughter, who chose to get as far 
away as she could from her “temperamental”, drug addicted mother, deprived her of her 
last scraps of energy. But today she has managed to soldier up and go out to the street. 
Maybe thanks to the last remains of the cocaine and the alcohol in her veins, or maybe 
due to some other inexplicable reason, today she feels a little stronger, as if she can 
handle whatever the street will come up with. She is a woman that dies hard. She can 
manage.  
        A man’s voice. “How much?” he asks. They talk for a minute and agree upon a 
price. Actually he looks all right. They go up to his small apartment on the second floor. 
But then she withdraws. The deal suddenly looks problematic. At that moment, she 
recalls that she dropped a note of money on the way up. Without it she will not be able to 
buy drugs even after she is paid by this man. She goes out to find it. He pursues her. He 
wants her to do what they agreed upon. He promises a larger payment. He shows her a 
money bill. She decides to return. 
          But at the apartment things again go awry. He wants more than she is willing to 
give. He says that for the money he is paying he is entitled to get more. She says that this 
not what they agreed upon. She wants to get out. To stop. Right away. She cannot take it 
any longer. She is willing to give up the payment. She puts on her panties and her shirt. 
She reaches for her bag. But he insists she must give him what he wants. She feels 
trapped. She knows she must get out now. She is thinking about her friends’ stories about 
johns that locked them in. She recalls what happened to her some years ago with a violent 
client that smashed her for hours before she could escape his apartment. She feels the 
walls are suffocating her, and she cannot stay there, with this man, even for a minute 
longer. She is terrified. She gives up her money, and rushes towards the terrace. She 
bends over the rail and plans the way down. She knows she can make it. She survived 
tougher situations. “Only two floors,” she tells herself. “You can do it.” But her bare feet 
lose their grip. And her solitary death finds her there, on the pavement in the south of Tel 
Aviv.  
 
A rose is a rose is a rose, wrote Gertrude Stein83. Paraphrasing this puzzling adage, we say harm 
is harm is harm. As we put forward, the saying represents a double-phased associative move. 
According to the first phase, some occurrences must be brought forward and adamantly 
presented, particularly because they are transparent. The second phase of the move is associated 
with the enigmatic repetitive nature that turned Stein’s words into a cultural icon. According to 
our reading, the uncommon reiterating sheds light on the reiterated word, and forces the audience 
to contemplate upon it. The announcement harm is harm is harm places the hidden and denied 
harms of prostitution to forefront. It tags it as harm clearly and adamantly. It enhances the 
meaning of the harm and the consequences it entails. It makes it harder to dismiss. 
                                                 
83 Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily, in GEOGRAPHY& PLAYS 178-188 (1922). 
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